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I've been rich, and I've been poor, and rich is better - Pearl Bailey
Abstract
This paper is about the reasons why there is so rarely a strong association between the secular
trend in real wages and mortality.  We classify the reasons in several different categories:
epidemiological, sociological, geographical, demographic, technologic, and economic.  In addition,
we offer some speculations on why there has been an expectation that such an association would
exist.  We suggest that this expectation is found primarily in British work (including Britain
overseas) and has to do with the history of the British experience of industrial and economic
growth and its pervasive interpretations.
Introduction
That the secular trends in per capita income or real wages do not invariably predict the secular trend in
mortality is on the face of it surprising, for everyday experience suggests to us, as it did to our
ancestors, that it is better to be rich than poor, and that the life chances of the rich are generally better
than those of the poor.  Nonetheless, as Wrigley and Schofield (1981:310–332), have shown using
several centuries’ worth of British data, the association between real wages and mortality is only
evident in a few years of significant economic decline, and many years of crisis mortality were not
preceded by declines in wages.1  Livi-Bacci (1990:99-107), has summarized comparable data from
other European populations, and Pope (1992), as well as others, has demonstrated a comparable
                                                
*Our initial assignment from John Landers, the conference organizer, was to discuss why the usual expectation of a
secular relationship between changing real wages and changing mortality was not always realized.  We more broadly
interpreted the question to relate to class and status (‘rank’) differences in mortality.  It should be clear that the
‘ranks of death’ we refer to differ from those suggested in the pioneering work of P.M. Ashburn as well as its use in
the familiar poem by Thomas Moore:
The Minstrel Boy to the war has gone
In the ranks of death you’ll find him.
1 It should be noted that while the expected relationships would be between income and mortality, the longer
availability of estimates for real wages than for incomes means that many historical studies use the former as a proxy
for the latter.  In addition, there are rather complex issues relating to the expected form of the relationship between
income and mortality which will influence the nature of the procedures used for analytical purposes.  These reflect
not only the specifics of the epidemiological relationship between income-related variables and mortality but also the
statistical procedures used in examining the long-term time series in which there are attempts to distinguish secular
trends from business cycles.
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phenomenon in the United States in the nineteenth century: in the antebellum period, at a time of rapid
economic expansion, life expectancy of native-born white Americans was actually deteriorating.
In this paper we shall describe secular patterns of change in income and mortality; suggest some of
the reasons why commonsense observations of the association between income and life chances are not
reflected in the secular association between them; explore some of the reasons why, however, such a
relation has commonly been assumed to be the case; and discuss some ways of thinking about the
causes of disease and death that may be applicable to considerations of the impact of real wages and
income on mortality.
Secular changes in income and mortality
One of the major characteristics of the modern world has been a substantial secular decline in death
rates at all ages as well as a marked diminution in fluctuations in mortality from one year to the next.
Starting most dramatically with eighteenth-century Britain, the declines spread to most of the developed
nations of Europe and its overseas extensions in the nineteenth century, and then in the twentieth
century to most of the rest of the world (see Table 1).  For the developed nations, of the 25-point decline
in crude death rates between 1750 and 1970 20 per cent occurred before 1900 and over one-half after
the First World War.  For the less-developed regions, of the estimated 20-point decline in death rates,
all occurred in the twentieth century, more than one-half coming in the post-World War II era.  The
decline in fluctuations in death rates, a precondition to any sustained mortality decline, occurred first in
the developed nations by the early nineteenth century, whereas in less-developed parts of the world such
dampening occurred much later in the nineteenth century.2
With the well-known divergence between developed and less-developed nations in the growth and
levels of per capita income over this period, there was a sharp change in the cross-national relation
between income and mortality.  The initial differences in mortality before the widespread onset of
modern economic growth appeared relatively minor, at least in comparison with those which emerged
in the epoch between the middle of the nineteenth century and World War II.  After World War II, the
accelerated mortality decline in the less-developed nations meant a narrowing of the worldwide gap,
and a movement toward the narrower differentials of the more distant past.  Such narrowing has
continued, at least into the 1980s, and, even while aggregate differences in mortality remain which
appear correlated with income levels, these appear relatively small by historical standards.3
Table 1
Estimated and conjectured average annual crude birth rates, crude death rates, and rates of
natural increase for currently more developed and less developed regions, from 1750 to 1970
(rates per 1,000 per year)
More-developed regions Less-developed regions
Period Birth rate Death rate Natural
increase
Birth rate Death rate Natural
increase
1750–1800 38 34 4 41 37 4
                                                
2 Sources:  Stolnitz (1955); Kuznets (1966:Chap. 2); United Nations (1973: Vol I. Chap. 5); Flinn (1981); World
Bank (1990:230–231).
3 See Gwatkin (1980), and Stolnitz (1955).  There may be some reversal of the decline in the less-developed nations,
but mortality rates still will be lower than they had been earlier.  Nevertheless, the crude death rates in the lowest-
income region in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s are below the rates in the developed nations before World War I.
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1800–1850 39 32 7 41 36 5
1850–1900 38 29 9 40 38 2
1900–1910 34 21 13 41 34 7
1910–1920 26 23 3 40 37 3
1920–1930 28 16 12 41 31 10
1930–1940 22 14 8 41 29 12
1940–1950 20 15 5 40 28 12
1950–1960 22 10 12 43 22 21
1960–1970 20 9 11 41 17 24
Source: United Nations (1971:Table 3)
Clearly these mortality changes seem related to what some would call modern economic growth
or, used descriptively, modernization.  The concept of modernization often includes, among other
things: substantial growth in income; an eventual narrowing of the distribution of income among
individuals and families within a nation; an increased role for the government in the provision of goods
and services within the economy; a broadened application of the results of modern science and
technology; a shift in the location of population from rural to urban areas; and a reduction in the share
of production in the agricultural sector and increase in the share from industry and services.4  Such
changes are not inevitable, for it is clear that not all nations have experienced all or even some of these
changes.  It does appear that as economic growth, or the desire to achieve growth, has spread, many of
these features have emerged in less-developed nations, even though it is possible for major social and
economic changes to occur without the accompanying full range of modern development, and for some
countries or parts of countries to remain backward even though the population may wish for economic
growth and modernization.  Thus, for example, the diffusion of modern technology may permit changes
in a country that are seemingly not related to the level of its national income.
Britain, the first industrial nation, had a pattern of mortality decline basically consistent with that
of the developed nations described above.  Indeed, both because it paradigmatically typifies the
expectations of modernization and also because of the great depth of historical research on the issue,
Britain is no doubt the nation whose mortality decline has been most studied and which has therefore
done most to set the terms of the ensuing debate.  According to Fogel’s (1986) calculations of
standardized death rates, from 1700 to 1980 the British death rate fell to a quarter of its earlier level,
from 28 per 1,000 to seven per 1,000, with 80 per cent of this decline occurring after 1850, and about a
half of the overall decline occurring in the twentieth-century.  According to Crafts’s (1985:44-47)
estimates, British economic growth averaged 0.3 per cent per annum in the years 1700 to 1830.
Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee (1982:22), indicate that the British growth of Gross Domestic
Product per man-year averaged about 1.2 per cent per annum from 1856 to 1973.  Clearly, the
accelerated increase in the growth of per capita income is associated with an accelerated decline in
mortality, as well as with dramatic shifts in the location of the population from rural to urban areas, and
with significant changes in the contribution of various diseases to mortality; a shift from epidemics to
endemic infectious diseases and, finally, to a phase characterized by chronic diseases.5
The early date of British growth, Britain’s unique patterns of household organization, the great role
played by moneyed-wage labour, and the importance of Marxian and other debates concerning modern
                                                
4 See, among many sources, Kuznets (1966).  Obviously not all these changes have occurred in all places and it may
be that in the future the patterns will not be the same as in the past.  For example, in many countries tourism, rather
than industry, is seen as an engine of growth.
5 With this has come a shift in the age-structure of mortality, with an increasing proportion of elderly among
decedents.  See Omran (1971).
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economic growth, all make the centrality of Britain to debates on the relation of income and mortality
understandable.  But precisely these and other characteristics may limit the applicability of the British
discussion to other nations.  For example, the more limited role of state intervention in the process of
economic change in Britain than elsewhere in Western Europe may mean a greater reliance on
individual-level behaviour and market mechanisms than upon state-directed measures.  The early onset
of economic growth, which predated many scientific, technological, and medical measures, meant that
there were fewer personal and public-health interventions available to Britain at any level of national
income than were accessible to follower nations.  And the economic growth patterns of follower nations
may not resemble fully that of the leader nation, if only because that niche in the world economy had
already been filled.
Lastly, the greater salience of wage labour in Britain, and the long time period covered by the
historical record, have made possible the use of an independent variable––real wages––that is
sometimes limiting and can be misleading.  Given the lack of a fully articulated concept of national
income before the 1930s, and, thus, the inability to relate income and mortality for much of the past, the
widespread use of measures of real wages (nominal wage rates divided by a relevant consumer price
index) is understandable.  Real wage data are more generally available in the past; they go back for
longer periods than incomes can be constructed; and they permit details concerning intertemporal
changes that most income estimates do not.  As a result, they provide incomplete measures of economic
well-being for societies in which farmers represent a large proportion of the population (more typical
outside of Britain).  Moreover, because wages are paid to individuals, they may not provide the best
possible measure of family well-being.
Clearly, then, worldwide there has been an association between economic growth and reduced
mortality.  Moreover, because of its leading role in the economic expansion of the modern era,
arguments that may have been adequate to explain the association in Britain have often been
extrapolated to explain the patterns of mortality change elsewhere.  However adequate or inadequate
such explanations have been in respect of the British situation, it is inappropriate to extrapolate them to
other populations.  For there has been a great deal of diversity among peoples, much of which
contributes to changes and differences in mortality in ways that may obscure or make irrelevant the
significance of the level of and changes in wages that have so dominated debates about the British
pattern.
Some problems in assessing the association between income and mortality
There are various categories of reasons which explain why it might be difficult to see, at the national
level, a relation between wages and mortality.  We shall discuss these briefly, using both longitudinal
and cross-sectional studies for our examples.
Epidemiologic
In an early study of the relationship between social status and mortality, Antonovsky (1967) argued that
life expectancy of rich and poor tended to be the same in periods when epidemics and pandemics
dominated the mortality regime, and that differences began to emerge only when epidemics abated.
Life-expectancy patterns of the British peerage and the general population generally support this view
(Hollingsworth 1964; Wrigley and Schofield 1981).  For it was only in the mid-eighteenth century that
the experience of the two groups diverged.  This seems to have been at a time when epidemics were
receding and when nutritional status, domestic arrangements, and individual hygiene began to have a
relatively greater impact upon health than was the case previously (Kunitz 1983, 1987).
Another example, presented by Curtin (1989), is taken from the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century experience of the British Army in India.  As Table 2 indicates, officers died at higher rates than
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other ranks.6  Unfortunately, the data are not age adjusted, and it is possible that the officers were older
than the others and thus would have had higher mortality on that basis.  Nonetheless, it seems plausible
to argue that exposure to a new disease environment would have adversely affected the experience of all
ranks about equally.
Table 2
Death rates of officers and other ranks of the British army in India, 1899–1913
Average annual rate per  1,000
Years Officers Other ranks
1899–1908 11.97 11.63
1909–1913 6.27 4.74
Source:  Curtin (1989:99)
A third example is taken from a series of studies by Barker and his colleagues (Barker and
Osmond 1987; Barker 1989; Barker et al. 1989), in which birth weight, weight at one year of age, and
early environmental conditions have been associated with the risk of death from cerebrovascular and
ischaemic heart disease, as well as other conditions during adulthood.  The causal mechanisms are not
at all clear and presumably involve interactions with adult diet and other factors.  Whatever the
mechanism, the increase in relative risk of death from ischaemic heart disease as birth weight and
weight at one year decline is very impressive.  If there is an association between prenatal and early
childhood environment on the one hand and risk of premature death in adulthood on the other, then the
temporal association between income and mortality, even when lagged by one or several years, would
not necessarily be significant.  This would be particularly true in open societies with a great deal of
upward and downward social mobility between generations, and in eras when non-infectious diseases
dominated the epidemiologic regime.
The point of this example, then, is that cohort effects of which we have very little understanding as
yet may well transmit increased or decreased risks of death across generations in such a way as to
weaken contemporary associations between income and mortality.
Sociologic
The social organization and culture of groups may well have an impact upon health status and the risk
of death that is relatively independent of income.  Our first example is taken from a contemporary
prospective cohort study of the associations among social support, socioeconomic status, and mortality
(Berkman and Breslow 1983:Chap. 4).  The measure of social support included marital status, contacts
with friends and relatives, and involvement in church and non-church groups.  The data are displayed in
Table 3.
Table 3
Age-adjusted mortality rates from all causes (per 1000): social network index and socioeconomic
status, men and women ages 30–69, 1965–1974
                                                
6 Curtin (1989) has pointed to the contemporary argument that this might be explained as the result of different
degrees of discipline applied to the groups.
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Social network index Socioeconomic status
Lower Lower middle Middle Upper middle Upper
Men
Least connections 11.8 12.7 16.6 11.7 7.3
Most connections 8.0 11.1 6.3 8.1 4.2
Total 9.9 11.7 9.5 9.1 5.2
Women
Least connections 9.9 7.3 8.2 6.8 5.7
Most connections 7.3 1.1 4.9 4.1 5.2
Total 8.8 4.6 6.6 5.2 5.4
Source:  Berkman and Breslow (1983:137)
Several results are noteworthy.  First, in general, people of high socioeconomic status had larger
networks than people of low status (data not shown).  Secondly, within each socioeconomic stratum,
people who reported a lot of contact with others had better survival over the nine-year follow-up period
than people with little contact; even controlling for health status at the outset of the study.  Thirdly,
there were major differences in mortality across status groups associated with the social network index.
For example, upper-middle status men with low network scores had higher mortality (11.7 per 1000)
than lower status men with high network scores (8.1 per 1000).  Thus, depending upon the
socioeconomic composition of the population and the variations in social organization within and
among strata, there might or might not be an association between income and mortality.
Our second example is taken from Woodbury’s (1926) classic study of infant mortality in
American cities from 1911 to 1915.  It was observed that while income had the expected relationship to
infant mortality, there were major differences among ethnic groups that could not be explained either by
income (measured as earning of the father) or by feeding practices.  The data are displayed in Table 4
and indicate the following: when level of income is controlled, Jewish infants had about half the
mortality rate of white native-born infants and substantially lower rates than infants of other
nationalities and races as well; Italians had half the rate of Portuguese; and Germans had about the same
rate as native-born whites.
Table 4
Relative mortality by nationality of mother, when influences of type of feeding and earnings of
father are eliminated, 1911–1915
Colour and
nationality of
mother
Ratio of actual to expected deaths
%
On basis of average
rate
Eliminating
feeding
Eliminating
earnings
Eliminating
both
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
White 97.4 96.9 99.2 98.3
Native 84.4 80.9 95.3 88.5
Foreign-born 114.2 119.4 103.4 109.3
Italian 93.4 109.9 76.6 86.8
Jewish 48.1 55.6 48.1 49.3
French-Can. 154.0 127.9 154.9 127.6
German 92.7 94.2 92.7 97.0
Polish 141.4 169.5 118.1 149.5
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Portuguese 180.1 166.5 146.9 141.1
All other 116.5 119.9 106.2 106.5
Coloured 138.8 149.3 108.4 118.4
Source:  Woodbury (1926:114)
These results for Jews are not unique.  Similar findings have been reported from Europe as far
back as the late eighteenth century (Schmelz 1971).  A variety of explanations have been offered,
ranging from the attention lavished on Jewish infants by their mothers, to birth spacing, to the
observation of dietary laws, and to the bactericidal effects of chicken soup.  It is not clear even now
what the best explanation is, but all are agreed that it is a cultural phenomenon that has been largely
independent of income.
Our third example is drawn from Caldwell’s (1986) study of several anomalous countries which
have both low income and low mortality and thus violate the more commonly observed association
between low income and high mortality.  The two nations (Costa Rica and Sri Lanka) and one state
(Kerala, in India) he scrutinized particularly closely, had several things in common which resulted in
this remarkable accomplishment: female autonomy; considerable investment in both education and
health services on Western lines, with females achieving educational levels similar to those of males;
efficient, responsive health services accessible to all regardless of income; provision of either a
nutritional floor or food distribution in an egalitarian fashion; and universal immunizations and
intensive prenatal and postnatal care.  In each case these measures derive from a history and political
culture which has led to ‘a broad social consensus as to the value of educational and health goals, and as
to their cost, for successive governments to accept most of their adversaries’ innovations instead of
nullifying them’ (Caldwell 1986:210).
These three examples have been meant to illustrate the fact that at the individual, ethnic-group, and
national levels, cultural and social-organizational factors operating independently of income have a
profound influence on mortality at all ages.  Thus we see once again that non-economic factors may be
of enormous significance and that, depending upon the composition and culture of the population being
observed, income may have greater or lesser effects on death rates.
Geographic
Under this rubric we include the well-known differences between rural and urban mortality that
prevailed until early in the present century.  Table 5 displays age-adjusted death rates by occupational
class for males 15 years of age and older in England and Wales in 1910-1912 at a time when the
differences were still very much in evidence.  Within the urban occupations there is a clear gradient of
mortality by occupational status.  The differences are small or non-existent between farmers and farm
labourers.  For our purposes, however, what is especially significant is that farm labourers have lower
mortality from virtually every cause, including those not shown here, than much more highly-paid
urban professional and salaried workers.
Table 5
Age-adjusted mortality rates (per 100,000) for men 15 years of age and above in England and
Wales by occupational class, 1910–1912
Occupational group Phthisis
(tuberculosis)
Non-
pulmonary
tuberculosis
Bronchitis Pneumonia Diabetes Cancer
Professional and salaried 145 14 52 71 25 126
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Skilled labour 180 14 110 81 15 131
Unskilled labour 244 19 172 149 11 159
All wage earners 172 15 122 97 12 129
Farmers 61 10 55 60 20 101
Farm labourers 85 14 67 55 7 93
Source:  Collins (1927:23–24)
A similar result emerges from an analysis of infant and child mortality rates in urban and rural
Holland in 1877-1881 (see Table 6).  The rates of death were lower among the children of the rural poor
than they were among the children of the urban well-to-do.
As in our previous examples, these too suggest that the composition of the population, in this case
rural-urban mix, can have a profound influence on the association between income and mortality.
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Table 6
Mortality rates per 1,000 live births for children in Holland by economic status, 1877–1881
Economic status Rates per 1,000 live births
Urbana Ruralb
< 1 year 2–5 years < 1 year 2–5 years
Rich 93 52 110 27
Well-to-do 139 94 91 52
Less well-to-do 157 103 107 64
Poor 166 115 112 70
aRotterdam and Dortrecht
b40 rural communities
Source: Collins (1927:45)
Demographic
It is plausible that with advancing age, considerations other than income become increasingly important
in determining the risk of death.  One example of this is the so-called mortality cross-over in which the
old in poor populations have lower rates of death than the old in relatively rich populations.  A second
example comes from a prospective cohort study in Zutphen, The Netherlands, in which men who were
between 40 and 59 in 1960 were interviewed, examined, and then followed for 25 years (Duijkers et al.
1989).  The men were grouped in four categories: (1) professionals, managers, and teachers; (2) small
business owners; (3) non-manual workers; and (4) manual workers.  Table 7 displays the all-cause
mortality-risk ratios for each category using professionals, managers, and teachers as the reference
group.
Table 7
Risk ratios of socioeconomic status on 25-year mortality stratified by age in a sample of men
(N=856); Zutphen follow-up study
Socioeconomic status Birth period
1900–1909 1910–1919
Risk ratioa 95% C.Ib Risk ratio 95% C.I.
Small business owners 0.91 0.63–1.32 2.25 1.27–3.97
Non-manual workers 0.90 0.61–1.32 1.63 0.91–2.89
Manual workers 0.92 0.66–1.28 2.07 1.17–3.66
aReference population is men in the highest social class: professional, managers and teachers.
b95 per cent confidence interval.
Source: Duijkers et al. (1989) Table 2.
For the older men, those in their 50s in 1960, there was no difference in the risk of death from one
occupational group to another.  For the men who were in their 40s in 1960, there was increased risk
among the owners of small businesses and among manual workers.  The authors speculated
... that age is an increasingly important factor as one becomes older, even to such an extent
that other factors like SES (socio-economic status) are no longer important.  It is also
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possible that the harmful effects related to SES play a more important role at a relatively
young age.  As a result the different socioeconomic groups become more and more alike
as time goes by (Duijkers et al. 1989:661)
The point of this example is to suggest that the aging process itself may have consequences that
over time become relatively more important than socioeconomic status.  This is simply another case in
which socioeconomic status is but one of several factors, and perhaps not the most significant,
associated with increased or decreased risk of death.
Technologic
The association between income and mortality may be unstable because the technology of public and
personal health has changed.  In a cross-national study of gross national product per capita and life
expectancy, Preston (1976) has shown that higher income is indeed correlated with greater expectation
of life at birth in the 1930s just as in the 1960s, but that the shape of the relationship has changed.
The later curve appears to be steeper at incomes less than $400 and flatter at incomes over
$600.  In other words, for low income countries, a given increment in income tends to be
associated with a larger gain in life expectancy in the 1960s than in the 1930s7 (Preston
1976:76).
And, he continues several pages later,
The relations ... appear to shift systematically during the twentieth century.  In general, in
order to attain a certain life expectancy between 40 and 60, a nation required an income
level almost three times greater in the 1930s than in the 1960s ... The magnitude of the
shifts, combined with regional income data, suggests that some 75-90 percent of the
growth in life expectancy for the world as a whole over these three decades is attributable
to factors exogenous to a nation's contemporary level of income (Preston 1976:83).
These exogenous factors seem to be a variety of easily exported public- and personal-health
technologies.
Preston’s data may be understood in two ways.  First, over time at the same per capita income
increasing levels of life expectancy have been achieved.  And secondly, over time the same life
expectancy can be achieved at lower per capita income.  A similar result is observed if one considers
life expectancy in Britain, Japan, and Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Despite having per capita incomes considerably below those of Britain, Germany and Japan had earlier
achieved comparable life expectancies.  The mechanisms for this were, in Germany, public-health
measures 8, and in Japan, both public-health measures and differences in personal behaviour.9
These examples are meant to illustrate two points.  One, that income may be less crucially related
to life expectancy at some times than at others because new factors have emerged as significant in the
interim.  Among them have been new techniques for postponing death.  Two, implicit in the comparison
                                                
7 See also Preston and Haines (1991).
8 See Evans (1987).  Hamburg, being less willing to introduce public-health measures than other German cities, had
a major cholera epidemic in 1892, when no other European city did.  See also Brown (1988, 1989).
9 Hot tea, with boiling water, was safer than non-boiled water, the eating utensils differed for each individual, and
there was a market for the collection of human waste for fertilizer.  See Mosk and Johansson (1986); Hanley (1987);
Jannetta (1987); and Johansson and Mosk (1987).
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among Britain, Japan, and Germany is the trade-off between public spending and private income.
Perhaps it was the greater British belief in laissez-faire individualism, contrasted with the elevated role
of the state on the continent, that has led to a greater emphasis on individual-level factors such as real
wages and per capita income in analyses of the changing pattern of mortality.
Economic
So far we have treated the notion of real wages as unproblematic.  It is, however, highly problematic for
a number of reasons.  First, real wages can only be relevant in a society in which there are wages to be
paid.  Subsistence societies and those in which there are non-monetary exchanges may be status-ridden
and divided by wealth of various sorts, but wages play no role.  Moreover, status group membership
may be unassociated, or inversely associated, with mortality.  For example, in an as yet unpublished
analysis of infant and child mortality among the matrilineal Hopi Indians of the village of Oraibi during
the late nineteenth century, Levy (1990) has shown that women of prime and alternate lineages of high-
status clans had both higher fertility and higher rates of child loss than other women.  Prime lineages
controlled most of the clan lands; alternate lineages stood ready to inherit should the prime lineage die
out; other lineages, even of high-status clans, were marginal.  High-status clans controlled the best
lands.  By the wealth criteria relevant to Hopi Indians of a century ago, the richest women had the
highest rate of child loss.  Levy has proposed that this is the result of attempts to assure the birth and
survival of sufficient daughters to inherit the high quality land these high-status lineages controlled.
The paradoxical result of high fertility was shortened birth intervals and crowding, both of which
increased the risk of death.
Not only must there be wages for wages to have an effect, but the distribution of wages must be
taken into account.  For example, if there is a threshold effect for wages such that, once passed, very
little additional mortality reduction can be expected, then if income increases throughout a society there
could well be a changing relation between income and mortality.  If everyone rises above the threshold,
an income effect on mortality would no longer be observable.  There is indeed some evidence for a
threshold effect.  Reviewing a study of infant mortality in Baltimore in 1915, Collins (1927) observed:
The infant mortality rate ... shows a consistent fall as income increases even above ...
$1,250. ...Data in the original report show infant mortality according to income in three
classes above $1,850, up to $2,850 and over.  But there seems to be little tendency to
decrease after $1,850.  Additional income beyond a certain minimum does not seem to be
associated with infant mortality (Collins 1927:50).
Put another way, unless the risk of premature death is lower among the super rich than the very rich,
and the risk among the very rich is less than among the merely rich, then there must be threshold
effects.  No such gradient among the rich has ever been demonstrated of which we are aware.
So far we have discussed wages rather than income, for real wages have been the most frequently
used measured in discussions of the standard of living and its relationship to mortality, and we have
ignored the difficulties involved in estimating the real wage.10  The measurement of real wages requires
estimates of nominal wages for some specific composite or subgroup of workers in some specific
location, and some measure of their cost of living based on an appropriate set of prices for the particular
basket of goods consumed at that particular location.  Given different regional patterns of wages and of
prices; the relation of age, experience, and life-cycle status to wage rates; and the existence of wage
differentials by occupation and by skill level, it is not surprising that many different measures of
                                                
10 Much of the following material on the measurement of real wages is from Engerman (1990).
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changes in real wages over time have appeared in the literature.  Thus von Tunzelmann (1979) has
provided a range of measured real-wage changes of between zero and 150 per cent for the period
between 1750 and 1850.
There is also the vexing question of how real wages are to be related to even material standards of
living.  The nominal wage figure is for an employed individual, and could be hourly, daily, weekly, or
monthly, depending upon the specific case, or it could be based on the application of a piece-wage
system, directly related to output.  To go from this wage rate to an estimate of annual earnings, and to
family earnings, and then to a welfare equivalent requires, as has frequently been noted, a number of
major adjustments.  These include allowances for the extent of unemployment, for the labour effort or
intensity demanded, for any disutility or utility of urban living, and for the disutility of working
conditions, whether health-related or not.  To go from real hourly wages to real annual earnings requires
information on hours worked per day; the number of days worked over the course of the year; the
valuation of any in-kind payments (particularly board and lodging); the role of other income sources,
such as gifts, relief, and Poor Law payments; and aid from neighbours and kin.  It is also important to
know the extent to which workers held more than one job during the year, including time spent in
cottage-type industries.  And, to go from principal wage-earner to family incomes, it is necessary to
understand the determinants of labour-force participation rates by age and gender, and the contributions
to total family income of women and children.
Several additional significant problems of measurement must be considered, problems which could
serve to obscure any relation between income and mortality that might exist.  They affect attempts at
verbal description as well as statistical analysis, since the usual analysis presumes a virtually
simultaneous impact (within a short period of years) and a set of relations of a rather specific type.
While alternative specifications and descriptions might be suggested, it remains uncertain as to the
sensitivity of using aggregate data to capture these relations.
In some cases of disease and medical impacts, consequences occur many years after their initiating
causes.  For example, those survivors from cohorts that were aged 0-4 when an epidemic struck in the
early nineteenth century in central Massachusetts had, many years later, lower mortality rates than did
both older and younger non-stressed cohorts (Meindl and Swedlund 1977; Meindl 1982).  Similarly, the
study cited previously by Barker et al. (1989), indicated that the best predictor of adult heart attacks was
birthweight (and, thus, maternal health).  Thus the impact of the contemporary level of individual
income might be offset by the importance of some influences, including incomes, much earlier in life.
In addition, there may be a threshold level of income needed before which there will be an impact upon
mortality or, as in the Preston studies and in the study of infant mortality described above, some level of
income after which it will appear that there is no relation of income and mortality.  Thus some attempts
to find a continuous relation between income and mortality will be misleading; the appropriate set of
measurements must allow for the existence of the particular threshold level.
There are also the difficulties posed when the full impact of any cause must allow for a cumulation
of effects.  No one year, by itself, may leave a dramatic effect on mortality.  What may be required is
the accumulation of causal factors over a period of years.  Thus, for example, in a population of high
enough income, one year’s recession may not have any effects, whereas several years of decline will
have.  And, in earlier periods, the effect of a shortfall in any one year’s harvest will depend upon the
harvest conditions in prior years.
While statistical procedures can be devised to handle these problems, as well as such other
problems as allowing for the magnitude of the secular trend, there remains some question as to whether
these can fully capture the appropriate relation.  In regard to the detrending of time-series data, the
precise explanation for the trend behaviour (and thus for the determination of the most appropriate
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statistical form) and the nature of the linking between the trend and cyclical patterns are important
considerations.11
Two problems raised by the foregoing discussion of real wages merit somewhat more elaboration:
aggregation from local to national levels, and the role of the state not only in providing services but in
redistributing both income and food in times of want.  We shall deal with each briefly.
Aggregation.  There is a long tradition of studies of the relationship between income, wages, and
social class on the one hand and mortality and health status on the other, several of which we have
already cited.  Historically most of these have been cross-sectional and at the local level.  The
temptation, however, is often to extrapolate from these locally or temporally restricted data to the
national level, with results that may well be misleading.  For example, Hobsbawm (1957), in his now
classic contribution to the standard-of-living debate, asserted that mortality fell from the 1780s to the
1820s and then rose until the 1840s.  This assertion seems to have been based on local studies, for
aggregate data of the national level, which were not available to Hobsbawm in 1957, do not bear it
out.12 This suggests that even if any relationship existed between wages and mortality among the
working class featured in the standard-of-living debate, such a trend may not be generalized to the
entire population.  Local conditions were sufficiently diverse that one could not adequately extrapolate
to the national level without very broad coverage indeed.  In the absence of such coverage of both
income and mortality, generalizations would be either impossible or questionable.
Government intervention .  In his paper on the changing relationship between social class and life
expectancy, Antonovsky (1967) suggested that the convergence of the life expectancy of the rich and
poor in this century has been due largely to the emergence of welfare states.  We suggest that the very
emergence of the nation-state itself in the eighteenth century had the effect of dampening fluctuation in
mortality from both epidemics and famine.  This was the result of actions which only a reasonably
effective bureaucracy could engage in successfully: quarantine, the control of armies on their territory,
and the relief of local famines by shifting food from regions of surplus to those of want.  Indeed, writing
at the end of the eighteenth century, Malthus was one of the first to observe that mortality rates were
declining, and to relate the decline to changes in personal and public behaviour.
I think it appears that in modern Europe the positive checks to population prevail less and
the preventive checks more than in past times, and in the more uncivilized parts of the
world.
War, the predominant check to the population of savage nations, has certainly abated
even including the late unhappy revolutionary contests; and since the prevalence of a
greater degree of personal cleanliness, of better modes of clearing and building towns, and
of a more equable distribution of the products of the soil from improving knowledge in
political economy, plagues, violent diseases, and famines have been certainly mitigated,
and have become less frequent (Malthus 1960:Vol. 1:315).
He was not alone.  Contemporary continental mercantilist writers such as J. P. Frank and
successors such as Chadwick in Britain, Villerme in France and Virchow in Germany recognized that
mortality was not exogenous but the result of social arrangements which could be modified by personal
and public behaviour.13  Such behaviour must have diminished the sensitivity of mortality to
                                                
11 See the debate discussed in Brenner (1977) and Kasl (1979).
12 See Wrigley and Schofield (1981:414) and Deane and Cole (1962:127).
13 See, for example, Rosen (1958); Stangeland (1966) ; and Coleman (1982).
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fluctuation in wages and income, though it is difficult to provide adequate historical data in support of
such an assertion.
India at the start of the present century, however, provides an example of the impact of changing
public policy on mortality.  The development of a railroad network and the enhanced desire of the
British to provide an effective relief system, including the use of the transport system to move grain into
regions of potential famine, led to a dramatic decline in famine-related mortality, as well as declines in
average death rates after the start of the twentieth century.  Indeed, McAlpin (1983:218), argues that the
one major famine in India after the first decade of the twentieth century, in 1943-44, can be attributed to
the wartime destruction of the transport system and the shift in government concerns with World War
II.14
Clearly, then, the ability and willingness of governments to intervene in what would otherwise
have been calamitous conditions has attenuated the responsiveness of mortality to fluctuations in
income.  This has been true, not only in welfare states in the twentieth century, but in earlier centuries
as well.
The point we have wanted to make in this section is that, broadly speaking, there are two classes of
reasons why there is no secular association between mortality and real wages.  The first has to do with
the fact that mortality rates are the product of many different forces, not only wages, and it is a mistake
to attempt to capture them all under the rubric of economic status.  The second has to do with the fact
that, even accepting the very real importance of wages, there are profound difficulties and heroic
assumptions that must be made when reconstructing a wage series to relate to trends in mortality.  This
leads us to our final topic, which has to do with ways of thinking about wages and income as causes of
death.
Thinking about the association between income and mortality
Considering this litany of problems, what is surprising is not that there is no very impressive temporal
association between real wages and mortality, but that anyone ever expected there would be.  Mortality
rates and life expectancy are the final common pathways of numerous factors, including but not limited
to wages and income.  The fact that within any particular population at any particular moment the rich
are likely to do better than the poor is not to be wondered at.  The rich, after all, are better able than the
poor to clothe, feed, and house themselves (although, also, whether out of perversity or of ignorance,
sometimes better able to indulge in behaviour damaging to their health).  This ability to better clothe,
feed, and house themselves is why, within the appropriately chosen groups, income is generally but not
always inversely related to risk of death, and why, all things considered it is better to be rich than poor.
For example, Table 6 shows a tendency for infant and child mortality rates to increase with
decreasing economic status within the urban and rural populations (with an anomalous observation
among rich rural residents), even though between urban and rural residents of the same classes mortality
rates differ substantially.  That the association between socioeconomic status and mortality is not
invariably monotonic, however, is illustrated in Table 3.  The highest class invariably has lower
mortality than the lowest class, regardless of social network score.  In the middle ranks, however, the
pattern is far from clear, even when holding constant the social network score.
Given the facts that economic status is not always monotonically associated with mortality risk,
and that numerous factors other than wages and income influence mortality, are there ways of usefully
conceiving of the relationship between wealth and mortality?  The expectation of a monotonic
relationship between the two is analogous to the sometimes accurate but generally oversimplified
                                                
14 See also Sen (1981).
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association between specific micro-organisms and the onset of specific diseases.  Just as for some
preventative and treatment purposes it is reasonable to consider only the micro-organism and its host,
that is, when immunizing children or when treating certain infections with antibiotics, so for some
purposes it is useful to consider only the association between wealth and mortality.  On the other hand,
just as truly adequate understanding of particular diseases requires an understanding of the full
ecological setting, including sociocultural, microbiological, and pathophysiological factors, so does the
full understanding of mortality more broadly involve consideration of income or wealth as but one of
many factors which influence the risk of death in any particular setting.
Inevitably this kind of understanding involves local knowledge of a highly detailed and complex
nature which is often at odds with a strong desire that many of us also feel to achieve a more universal,
elegantly simple understanding at a very general level.  Usually it is the latter kind of knowledge which
is considered science.  The former is thought of as too particularistic to deserve such a label.  Without
getting into the debate about what is and what is not science, it should be clear that both kinds of
knowledge are of value.  It is important and useful to be able to make generalizations across societies.
It is equally important to be able to point to the many deviant cases that force us to question the validity
of the generalizations we sometimes make with such facility, and often so facilely.
These observations suggest that the association between wages and mortality is not entirely similar
to that between an essential nutrient and a deficiency disease.   Which is to say, death is not caused by
the lowering of wages in the same way that pellagra is caused by the absence of nicotinic acid.  Stated
so baldly, the assertion seems obvious.  It is not.  Implicitly that is the assumption underlying the
question with which we began.
Conclusion
It seems general that, over the past several centuries, both within and among societies, the rich, on
average, have had lower mortality rates than the poor.  It appears that at some stage the differentials
widened, but in the twentieth century there has tended to be some reduction without, however, yet
achieving complete equality.  Within this general pattern, however, there remain deviant cases.  In some
instances, a trade-off between the effects of individual income and social measures, such as public
health, makes income a less than perfect predictor of mortality; in others individual differences in
cultural and other aspects of behaviour mean that different mortality rates are experienced at similar
levels of individual income.  In addition the changing importance of different diseases––the shift from
infectious to non-infectious diseases––would confound any relationship.
Clearly, for most nations sometime in the past three centuries, there have been increases in per
capita income and reductions in the level of mortality.  At a gross level, therefore, these changes are
obviously associated.  Nevertheless, the fluctuations in each do not follow a systematic pattern nor, for
reasons discussed above, should we have expected that to have been the case.  Since mortality has
always been influenced by so many factors, including income, it would not be expected that any simple
one-to-one relation within a limited time span could be found.  Moreover, given the dramatic changes in
the distribution of incomes, occupations, educational levels, and so on, that occur with the process of
economic growth, any study at the level of national aggregates would mean combining groups with
possibly quite divergent experiences.
Whatever the relation of income and mortality posited within and among nations cross-sectionally,
the temporal association of national income and mortality rates has had many fewer adherents; and most
of these seem to have been in the English-speaking world.  More speculatively, it might be asked why
this assumed relationship has been of more salience in Britain and its overseas extensions than it seems
to have been elsewhere.  Focusing on real wages and per capita incomes in the analysis of mortality
reductions appears to reflect the same political culture that is associated with the developmental policies
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that the English-speaking world has generally followed; that is, an emphasis on the growth of individual
income as the most effective way to improve the quantity and quality of life.  Historically, as suggested
above, other societies have followed other paths to a similar demographic outcome.
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